3 cognitive processing comes between sensory stimulation and the subject's tokening of a LOT term with the content cat. As Cummins puts it, "To detect cats...requires a theory that says, in effect, what sorts of proximal stimuli are reliable indicators of catness. To detect cats visually, you have to know how cats look." (536) Alas, the subject can have no explicit knowledge of how cats look sans the ability to represent cats. Thus, for many human concepts of just the sort to which CT is supposed to apply, CT does not provide a viable theory of content; together with the facts of human perceptual psychology, CT implies that you must possess a concept of cats as a means of acquiring a concept of cats, which is impossible.
II. Innate and Unlearned LOT Terms
Cummins restricts the scope of the preceding argument: if there are LOT terms whose contents are fixed independently of explicit-theory acquisition, perhaps a causal theory of content applies to such terms. Here Cummins acknowledges the possibility that some LOT terms are innate, their content fixed independently of their appearance in explicit theories (Cummins suggests 'square' as a candidate--537). Still, causal theorists should postpone the celebration: given what would appear to be the limited stock of innate terms, Cummins considers it unlikely that nativism will rescue CT (537).
It is intuitively plausible that humans possess a relatively limited range of innate concepts, yet we should wonder whether this intuitive reaction can yield the result Cummins claims for it.
It is notoriously difficult to pin down the precise meaning of nativist claims, 4 which of course makes it difficult to evaluate such claims. What is more, the issue of innateness bears only indirectly on the present debate. When evaluating Cummins's argument against CT, the category of importance to the causal theorist--the category of terms that escape Cummins's attack--consists of terms that acquire content in the absence of explicit theories of those things to 4 which the terms apply. The force of Cummins's critique of CT rests squarely on cases where explicit theory mediates detection, where explicit theory must be present if the content of the pertinent LOT terms is to be fixed per CT. The greater the number of primitive LOT terms that can be acquired in the absence of explicit theory, the less destructive the causal theorist should find Cummins's argument. Let us use learned terms to refer to those LOT terms for which, assuming CT and NTDP, it is a necessary condition of their acquiring content that the human subject formulate an explicit theory of that to which the terms apply; call all other LOT terms unlearned. The present point can then be expressed as follows: We should not assume that the categories of unlearned terms and innate terms are coextensive. 5 Although some definitions of 'innateness' may be weak enough to apply to all unlearned terms, Cummins cannot rest happily defining 'innateness' in a permissive way. The specific purposes to which Cummins puts antinativist claims demand a strong definition of 'innateness'. When, for example, Cummins points out the obvious poverty of our innate conceptual endowment, he appeals to an intuition whose force rests on a strong notion of innateness: it is because we have in mind a demanding notion of innateness that the poverty of innate concepts seems so clear. If we limit our discussion to the more demanding definition of 'innateness' Cummins's arguments require, we have no reason to think that innate terms exhaust the contents of the class of unlearned terms. In what follows, I shall have a good deal to say about innateness and the role antinativist claims play in Cummins's critique of CT. Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the more fundamental point, concerning the scope and composition of the category of unlearned terms.
Sections III and IV establish a general conclusion: the category of unlearned terms seems likely to extend much farther than Cummins acknowledges. These sections do not alone rebut
Cummins's critique of CT, for no matter how large the category of unlearned terms, there likely 5 remain at least some primitive, learned LOT terms; if CT is to possess a satisfying degree of generality, the causal theorist must explain how causal relations can fix the content of primitive, learned LOT terms while avoiding the apparent circularity Cummins identifies. To this end, I
argue in section V that Cummins underestimates the theoretical resources available to the causal theorist in her attempt to explain LOT term acquisition: The initial framing of theoretical axioms that facilitate detection of Cs should be understood to include only a nonsemantically individuated LOT term 'C'. Individuating a newly coined LOT term according to contentindependent criteria allows us to see how a primitive LOT term can be introduced and its meaning fixed by theoretically mediated detection, without the term's having to possess content as a condition of its appearance in theoretical axioms
III. Innateness and the Emergence of Content
While Cummins accepts that some LOT terms may be innate, NTDP is non-negotiable:
theory mediates even the causal relation between innate terms and their contents. What is the nature of such theory? Are infants born possessing a theory of squares, sufficiently detailed and accurate to facilitate the reliable detection of squares? In a footnote, Cummins remarks on mediating theories from the standpoint of the LOT theorist: "According to LOT, if it [the mediating theory] is learned, it will be a set of sentences in LOT. If it is innate, it might, in some sense be implicit in the architecture." (536, n. 5) The former case drives Cummins's negative
argument, yet the latter deserves more attention. For the causal theorist wishing to lessen the force of Cummins's critique, the idea of an implicit theory seems to hold promise: if innate, implicit theory can, in the case of 'square', play the detection-mediating role required by CT and NTDP, why should not implicit theory, innate or otherwise, play such a role in the case of 'cat '? 6 Cummins briefly considers the idea that innate, implicit theory plays the requisite mediating role in the case of 'cat', but he cannot accept the implications of this view: in his words, "[W]e are not born knowing how cats look...We must, then, learn the theory that mediates cat recognition" (537). To give the discussion focus, I offer the following reconstruction of
Cummins's response to the nativist defense of CT:
(P1) CT can only account for the fixation of the content of the primitive LOT term 'cat' 6 by appealing either (a) to what the human subject knows at birth about cats or (b) to the human subject's acquisition of an explicit theory of cats.
(P2) What the human subject knows at birth does not fix the content of her primitive
Therefore, an explicit theory of cats must be acquired, if CT provides the correct account of how the human subject acquires the primitive LOT term 'cat'.
As Cummins presents the argument, and as I have formulated it, the conclusion pertains specifically to 'cat'. Yet for the argument to fulfill its purported function, it must apply to a wide range of primitive LOT terms: Cummins intends his overall argument to constitute a decisive critique of CT; a single counterexample to CT, while providing a challenge to causal theorists, would hardly devastate their research program. Presumably, then, Cummins chooses 'cat' somewhat arbitrarily, 'cat' standing in for a large class of primitive LOT terms all of which, assuming CT and NTDP, can only acquire content via the mediating effects of explicitly 7 represented theory (and thus, according to Cummins, are such that CT cannot account for the fixation of their content). In light of the generality of Cummins's point, one should at least begin to doubt that (P1) canvasses all of the ways in which a causal theorist might plausibly account for the fixation of the content of a primitive term in a human's LOT. In the subsections that follow, I offer specific reasons to think that (P1) fails to cover all of the relevant possibilities, or that if it does cover them all, it does so by presuming a weak interpretation of what it is to be innate or to know something at birth--so weak that (P1) and (P2) cannot legitimately collaborate in support of Cummins's conclusion.
A. Cummins rightly allows that innate, implicit theory might play the mediating role required by the conjunction of CT and NTDP; why, one may wonder, should the content-fixing power of implicit theory be limited to innate implicit theory? If implicit theories that mediate reliable detection can appear over time in the postnatal subject, (P1) does not cover all cases. Let us dub as E.I.-terms ('E' for emergent, 'I' for implicit) all primitive LOT terms whose contents are fixed, per CT, via the mediating effects of implicit theory that is not present at birth. That the human cognitive system contains E.I.-terms seems quite plausible, given the variety of ways in which information can be implicit 7 and the variety of ways in which the human cognitive and biological systems change over time. At the very least, implicit theories could emerge as "maturational changes" themselves dependent on the organism's prior interaction with its environment (for that matter, an implicit theory could appear as the result of a subject's suffering a head injury--the effect of a certain kind of unpleasant interaction with the environment).
8
In fairness to Cummins, we should pay careful attention to his description of implicit theory:
it is "in some sense, implicit in the architecture," according to Pylyshyn holds functional architecture fixed for explanatory purposes:
[T]he architecture must form a cognitive "fixed point" so that differences in cognitive phenomena can be explained by appeal to arrangements (sequences of expressions and basic operations) among the fixed set of operations and to the basic resources provided by the architecture...If the functional architecture were to change in ways requiring a cognitive rule-governed explanation, the architecture could no longer serve as the basis for explaining how changes in rules and representations produce changes in behavior.
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Appeals to functional architecture are supposed to yield explanatory power by accounting for cognitive processes: such appeals are intended to explain semantically characterized processes in terms of series of applications of nonsemantically characterized, simple operations, which operations are not themselves affected by processes described in semantic or representational terms (using Pylyshyn's now well-known description, these operations are not "cognitively 9 penetrable"). 11 This provides an important sense in which the functional architecture is fixed:
functional architecture is not subject to changes that must be characterized in cognitive terms;
instead, functional architecture's being mere physical mechanism, following laws of nature stated in nonsemantic terms, explains how cognitively characterized behavior can arise from, or be instantiated in, an underlying physical system.
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The preceding picture of functional architecture and its role as an explanatory fixed point does not require that each aspect of the functional architecture be either innate or unchanging.
Pylyshyn describes well the way in which the architecture can change and the way in which such changes can influence higher levels, i.e., the symbolic (sometimes called 'syntactic') and ultimately the semantic levels:
Thus biological factors interact with symbol level generalizations by causing modifications in the basic computational resources, which I call the functional architecture. Such modulations may be due to biochemical influences, maturation, the triggering effect of environmental releasers, dendritic arborization, atrophy of neural function from disuse, and so on. To dispel what intuitive appeal may still attach to (P1), I will argue that it is unfounded to equate a concept's being innate with the newborn's possession of theoretical knowledge. To this end, I now briefly survey some conceptions of innateness currently of interest to cognitive scientists, with the following question in mind: To what extent does any one of these conceptions of innateness imply that, for a subject to possess an innate concept, she must possess knowledge at birth about that to which the concept applies? I need not survey every concept of innateness ever seriously proposed. I merely intend to show that a good number of the conceptions of innateness presently on offer in cognitive science do not, taken together with CT and NTDP, sanction the inference from "C is innate" to "newborns possess knowledge of C's application sufficient to facilitate reliable detection of that to which C applies." Thus, we can accommodate the common intuition that any given concept must be either innate or learned, without accepting that a concept's innateness implies the newborn's possession of the relevant kind of knowledge.
Some of the conceptions of innateness I discuss imply that something relevant to concept acquisition is present in the newborn, and in some cases, what is present in the newborn seems similar to belief or knowledge (see footnote 19). However, the degree of similarity falls short of what is needed to support Cummins's conclusion. Although nativist views often impute knowledge or belief to the newborn, in many cases the mental states thereby attributed differ from knowledge and belief as these are normally conceived of, to such an extent that attributions 14 of such states do not justify Cummins's combination of (P1) and (P2). Some special terminology will facilitate the discussion that follows: Let us call ( Plunkett: "When we say that a form or a behavior is innate we really mean that, given normal developmental experiences, it is a highly probable outcome." 20 Note that (1) this conception of innateness is fairly attractive, for it seems to capture the main idea behind nativist arguments from the universality, or near universality, of outcome, while (2) this definition does not require that (P2)-knowledge be present in the newborn in order for some later-emerging behavior or cognitive structure to qualify as innate; 21 on this view of innateness, nothing more than the probability that a given outcome will appear in a given environment or range of environments determines the outcome's native, or nonnative, status. As a second option--the one they officially endorse--Elman et al. propose to use 'innate' "to refer to putative aspects of brain structure, cognition or behavior that are the product of interactions internal to the organism."
22
Here again, innateness does not require (P2)-knowledge. An innate concept must emerge from organismically internal relations, but this implies no particular form of knowledge present in the newborn supporting this emergence.
Elsewhere in developmental psychology, as well as in linguistics, much has been made of what appears to be an innate basis for a variety of capacities. It has been asserted, for example, 15 that humans possess innate knowledge of grammar, an innate theory of mind, and an innate object concept, as well as innate domain-specific capacities for recognizing faces and distinguishing between phonemes. 23 We do not find in this collection of work a distinctive or shared definition of 'innateness'; yet given the strong nativist claims often issuing from these quarters, it would be of interest if theorists working in these areas were to make nativist claims, while avoiding, or even eschewing, the attribution of (P2)-knowledge to the newborn. I do not assert that no researcher working on these topics has ever claimed the existence of (P2)-knowledge at birth. Nevertheless, even some of the staunchest nativists hedge their claims about innateness, as is illustrated by the two following examples.
First, take the case of Noam Chomsky, probably the single most important intellectual force in the nativist revival. Chomsky intentionally distances his nativist theses from what I am calling (P2)-knowledge. While he claims that our knowledge of universal grammar is innate--it is "somehow represented in the genotype"--he is careful to remind us that 'knowledge', as he uses the term, does not necessarily imply knowledge as it is normally conceived of; to avoid confusion, he says that we "cognize" universal grammar.
24
Second, consider the case of the child's theory of mind. While the theory of mind is frequently claimed to be innate, it is widely recognized that it takes three to four years for the theory to get up and running. Very little, if any, of the theory is present at birth (the tendency to imitate, perhaps?). It seems to make perfect sense to many researchers working in this area to take a nativist position regarding the child's theory of mind without claiming that the newborn has (P2)-knowledge of the theory.
25
Two views of innateness remain, both of some stature. In fairness to Cummins, we should note the misleading nature of some of Fodor's own remarks on the acquisition of primitives. In The Language of Thought, Fodor says, "My view is that you can't learn a language unless you already know one," 28 going on to characterize the known language as innate. This suggests the unnecessarily strong notion of innateness assumed 17 by Cummins, according to which a concept's being innate implies the presence of certain bits of (P2)-knowledge at birth. Nevertheless, as Fodor proceeds, he explicitly repudiates this strong notion of innateness: "The view presently being proposed doesn't require that the innate conceptual system must literally be present 'at birth', only that it not be learned."
29
The preceding survey, while necessarily brief, illustrates the genuine difficulty Cummins faces. His argument against CT succeeds partly by taking an expansive view of the class of learned terms and painting as hopelessly inadequate the set of primitive, unlearned terms: the latter set, Cummins implies, consists only of innate terms, about whose applications we must, at birth, possess knowledge sufficient to mediate content-fixation; and clearly, we have very few of these. However, given that contemporary cognitive science embraces a wide range of conceptions of nativism, many of which do not require (P2)-knowledge at birth, Cummins's approach seems misleading. Even if we identify the unlearned with the innate--in keeping with the intuition that any given concept must be either innate or learned--innateness does not imply the presence of the relevant (P2)-knowledge.
IV. The Emergence of LOT Terms Characterized Nonsemantically
Now consider the genesis of the vehicles of mental content. As Cummins describes LOT, "It has a finite number of semantically primitive expressions individuated syntactically" (535, emphasis added). I will construe the requirement of syntactic individuation as a requirement that LOT terms be individuated nonsemantically (there is, however, much more to be said about this issue). 30 The question then naturally arises, "What are the nonsemantic individuation criteria?"
Although alternative approaches exist, those inclined toward realism regarding mental representations often assume that we can, in principle, state these criteria in the language of neuroscience. 31 32 When we think of LOT terms in this way, we see that LOT terms, even those typically classified as innate, emerge in the child's cognitive system over time: the very neural structures that are to become vehicles for content appear largely as a result of the child's interaction with her environment.
A summary excursion into developmental neurobiology may help to clarify my point.
Developing brains grow and change in numerous and varied ways. Despite what looks to be a messy, nonlinear process of growth and change, stable neural structure emerges, which subserves the subject's representational capacities. In an attempt to understand this process of emergence, neuroscientists ask such questions as (1) How does the overall functional structure of the brain appear without there being a tiny map of the brain's ultimate layout contained in the genetic material? and (2) How does experience contribute to the development of the functional properties of various neural structures? A commonly given answer to the first question leads immediately to prosecution of the second. It is widely thought that overall structure emerges via the delicate interplay of multiple factors: there is, it is said, an epigenetic dance, experience appearing as one of the key participants. To a significant extent, the subject's experience shapes her neural substrate, determining the way in which the physical material of her brain eventually realizes its function as the center of cognitive processing. The interesting debate here is not over whether experience affects neural development--the experimental evidence seems to have settled that issue--but over the precise role of experience in shaping the structure of the brain. 33 On one side in this debate stands the selectionist approach, a view closely associated with the work of Gerald Edelman. 34 According to selectionist views, genetically programmed growth provides a wealth of raw material that experience, among other factors, then winnows to create functional neural structure. Early development consists partly of the spreading of billions of dendritic and axonal arbors. Rich in synapses, these overlapping branches provide an enormous 19 number, in the quadrillions, at least, of possible ways in which groups of neurons might excite or inhibit each other. Of these various patterns of connections, experience reinforces and strengthens those that have proven most useful to the organism, or which have simply been used more than competing ones. The activity of strengthened patterns of connectivity overshadows the less useful or less used patterns of connections, resulting in ineffective activity in the overwhelmed connections; dendritic or axonal retraction or withering; or even cell death.
Constructivism offers an alternative. 35 Constructivists agree with selectionists that experience contributes to regressive events. However, they assign a further role to experience: it guides the generation of axonal and dendritic arbors and can selectively increase the number of synapses in a given area of the brain or a given neural circuit; experience does so at least as early as the perinatal stage and as late as adulthood. Constructivists claim that such environmental instruction causes the growth of the very neural resources that are needed to represent aspects of problems the subject will solve using those resources: the specific character of experience catalyzes the growth of the neural resources needed to more effectively process the input that triggered the development of those resources. While some selectionists accept that there are multiple waves of growth and pruning within the life span of one organism, this is the fundamental point of disagreement between the two camps: whether experience can, as constructivists claim, cause axonal and dendritic growth or increases in the number of synapses in a way that is sensitive to the content or structure of the input itself.
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The preceding discussion of perspectives on neural development gives some indication of the prevalence of epigenetic views among contemporary neuroscientists. 37 This points serves three purposes: (1) to underscore the false nature of Cummins's dilemma offered in (P1), by describing some mechanisms likely to govern the emergence of nonsemantically individuated 20 LOT terms in humans, mechanisms that would seem operative in cases of at least some primitive, unlearned LOT terms, (2) to illuminate the integrative vision above attributed to Pylyshyn, involving the purely physical emergence of new elements of cognitive architecture, which elements then subserve cognitive processes conceived of semantically, and (3) to provide background for the discussion of the following section, wherein I put to further use the distinction between LOT terms typed by their content and LOT terms conceived of nonsemantically.
Regarding any given primitive LOT term, Cummins asserts that the causal theorist must choose between its being (a) innate, the fixation of the term's content mediated by knowledge possessed at birth, and (b) acquired at least partly by the subject's formulating an explicit theory of that to which the term applies. If selectionists or constructivists are correct, the vast majority, perhaps all, of an adult's nonsemantically individuated LOT terms appear in no substantial form at birth. This list of nonsemantically individuated concepts not present at birth seems quite likely to include such LOT terms as 'physical object', 'subject' (in the grammatical sense), and 'belief', terms that would seem primitive and unlearned and, when categorized according to their content, are often considered innate. Many such concepts are plausibly innate, in some sense: they emerge in all standard subjects across a wide variety of contexts. Nonetheless, they do not fit
Cummins's description of unlearned terms. They do not seem to be associated with contentfixing knowledge present at birth, even implicitly represented knowledge. How could they be?
These concepts, nonsemantically individuated, have yet to appear on the developing subject's cognitive scene. 38 Thus, such terms do not seem to fall into either of the categories Cummins recognizes. The causal theorist should feel free to account for the fixation of these terms'
contents by appeal to something other than the processes allowed by (P1). Cummins's fundamental objection to CT is thus dissolved: Take learned concept C. Given CT and NTDP, the subject cannot possess a concept with the content C unless she possesses a nonsemantically individuated vehicle 'C'; the vehicle must be present to hold a place in the subject's theory of Cs. However, 'C', characterized nonsemantically, does not have to have content C when it first appears in the axioms constituting the theory that mediates the fixing of content C to vehicle 'C'. The alleged circularity of CT vanishes.
To flesh out and defend this proposal, I respond below to a series of critical questions:
Q. #1: What causes the brain/cognitive system to produce a new LOT term that will be the subject of an explicit theory?
A. #1: When the subject encounters a cluster of properties not sufficiently similar to any stored cluster (each cluster embodying a mediating theory), her cognitive system introduces a new primitive term. The term-introduction rule could itself be either explicitly represented or implicit in the architecture (although in what follows, I assume what I take to be the more plausible possibility: that the rule is implicit in the system's workings). Of course, the system must already be capable of representing the properties in the cluster, but this does not imply that said cluster defines the newly introduced term (see note 42). Note that if a new experience causes a change in theoretical axioms in which t appears, this does not imply that the cognitive system explicitly represented error in its earlier theory of t.
Whatever theory, implicit or otherwise, governs the introduction of new LOT terms may do so by measuring the match between a newly encountered item and stored, associated clusters of properties (such clusters are sometimes called 'prototypes'). In a case where the mismatch between the new item and stored clusters is not so great as to cause the coining of a new LOT term, the result is a value-neutral integration of the profile of the newly encountered item and whatever existing prototype most closely matches the new item's profile. Pace Cummins (538), 24 then, it is conceivable that the cognitive system alter a prototype, which embodies a theory, without the cognitive system's having to represent the prototype, prior to its alteration, as normatively mistaken. Implicit in the workings of the system is a theory that causes the coining of a new LOT term under some circumstances and the integration of new experiences and existing prototypes under others. 43 Admittedly, such an implicit theory has peculiar status, perhaps that of metatheory. Better still, we may think of the theory as part of the system's program, emerging from the arrangement of the physical matter that constitutes the cognitive system; in this case, the implicit "theory" may not be found among the cognitive system's mental states as we would normally describe them; for this reason, it may be misleading to call it a 'theory'. However, there is no reason to think that every such physical state is itself a representation;
granted, each such state is assigned a numerical value, but this does not imply that the physical state represents that numerical value. Whether we assign representational status to such physical states depends on the explanatory value of doing so, and sometimes there seems to be little value in such making such assignments. 47 Second, I do not hypothesize the existence of a computational system containing no representations: in the kind of system I have been discussing, representations abound; nevertheless, some newly coined LOT terms might not be among them. Note that many of the advocates of content-laden interpretations of computational processes rest their advocacy largely on the empirical fruitfulness of semantic talk. Such theorists typically agree that computational processes can be characterized in nonsemantic terms. It is not incoherent to talk about computational processes in, say, syntactic terms, such theorists will admit; they argue that semantic interpretation is indispensable if our cognitive models are to fully explain human behavior or cognitive processing. 48 The present view concurs to a great extent: I do not contend the claim that many, perhaps the majority of, elements participating in the computational processes underlying human cognition possess semantic values. However, turnabout is fair play, and if the serving of empirical virtues sometimes favors nonsemantic descriptions (or as I have suggested, "mixed" descriptions), then we should accept such descriptions. In particular, if we best explain the emergence of representational primitives by hypothesizing the presence of axioms, subject to computational manipulation, containing both representing and nonrepresenting elements, then this approach should be acceptable even to those, including myself, who think that content-based characterizations of some processes are required if we are to fully understand those processes.
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Here it is also important to bear in mind that newly coined LOT terms are, presumably, of the sort of structure whose instances often have content in the computationally conceived-of human cognitive system. On this view, all states that participate in cognitively relevant computational processes share certain non-content-determining, nonsemantically characterized traits; newly coined LOT terms, perhaps devoid of content, exhibit these traits and, as such, are candidates for participation in computational processes. Recalling that computation can be described at a nonsemantic level, we should not automatically exclude these structures from participation in computational processing; instead we should see them as potential representations, which have not yet, but may eventually, come into content-conferring relations to kinds or properties. It is in this sense that newly coined LOT terms can be protorepresentations, appearing in axioms upon which computational processes can operate, even when the content of the incipient representations is not yet fixed. These protorepresentations may bear the physical marks of computed-upon representations before such protorepresentations fully come into the causal relation that will, according to CT, fix their content. 49 Lastly, allowing some computation without representation does not imply an unacceptable proliferation of cognition; the conditions for being a cognitive system are much more stringent than simply that a system sometimes compute something. "No computation without representation" is a fine slogan when understood properly: nothing described as a computational system counts as a cognitive system unless it exhibits the kind of behavior or capacities best explained by positing internal representations over which at least some of the computations operate. So far as can be presently told, few, if any, nonhuman systems meet this condition. 
VI. Conclusion
If CT is to maintain any plausibility as a theory of content for human concepts, it must respect the known facts of human psychology, including human perceptual psychology. However, Cummins errs in thinking that the demand for psychological realism supports his case against CT. To show this, I first considered the ways in which concepts might emerge in the cognitive system. Cummins sees only two options: for any given concept, the causal-cum-LOT theorist must choose between saying (a) the subject has knowledge, at birth, of that to which the concept applies and (b) the concept's content is fixed via the mediating effects of an acquired, explicitly represented theory of that to which the concept applies. I have argued that this range of options is artificially limited: we should recognize the wide range of cases in which mental content and the vehicles of mental content emerge after birth in the absence of explicit theory. Cummins admits the power of implicit theory to mediate content-fixing reliable detection in the case of concepts about whose applications we possess knowledge at birth, yet it appears that implicit theory's detection-mediating power extends well beyond these cases. Correlatively, we should doubt that explicitly represented theory participates in content-fixation in as many cases as it has often been thought to. This point weakens Cummins's argument against CT, for the argument's force rests, to a significant extent, on the assumption that explicit-theory formation is a necessary condition of content-fixation for a large class of human concepts.
More damning to Cummins's case against CT was the argument of the penultimate section:
Even where explicit theory contributes to the fixation of content, there exists a possible route to content-fixation within the framework assumed by CT, a route that Cummins fails to consider. It is agreed on all sides that the LOT theorist must individuate LOT terms nonsemantically; interest here is Cummins's discussion of domain implicit information, which seems especially likely to emerge over time in the subject. Here one should also take into account much recent work on embedded cognition. This work encourages a minimalist view of the amount of internal, explicit representation necessary for a cognitive system to exhibit a full range of beliefs or possess a standard complement of knowledge or information. Those who view cognition as embedded claim that, in a surprising number of cases, we best explain human behavior and cognitive capacities without appealing to a rich set of internal representations and complex internal computational processes manipulating those representations; although some internal representations are admitted in these cases, it is claimed that the standard subject's cognitive states and capacities are, to a great extent, "off-loaded," i.e., stored in or heavily dependent upon the environment, and thus emerge from the relations the subject bears to her environment and its structure; if implicit theory is embodied in the relations themselves, it is easy to see how implicit theory could emerge over time, as the subject comes to bear the relevant relations to her environment. On embedded cognition, argues for the stronger thesis that cognition is extended: states and processes of the human cognitive system literally comprise parts of the world beyond the boundary of the organism. While more tendentious than the claim that human cognition is embedded, the view that cognition is extended also supports the present point. 11 Of course, this explanatory approach is not the only one possible. For some purposes, it may suffice to classify as basic certain semantically characterized processes and representations, explaining all other cognitive capacities by appeal to operations and arrangements of the basic, semantically characterized ones. However, this approach does not allow an account of the workings of the entire cognitive system in noncognitive, nonsemantic terms.
12 Among its other virtues, Pylyshyn takes this explanatory gambit to hold promise of at least a token reduction of cognitive processes; ibid., pp. 132-34.
13 Ibid., p. 259. See also p. 260, where Pylyshyn identifies control structures as part of the functional architecture.
In "Inexplicit Information," Cummins argues that information can implicitly reside in control structure (and, presumably, enough such information could constitute implicit theory). If functional architecture can change over time, and control structure is part of the functional architecture, and control structure can instantiate implicit theory, then implicit theory need not be innate in the sense of being present at birth.
14 RTA, p. 145. In the passages quoted here, Newell and Simon--and Pylyshyn--speak specifically of the nature of explicit representational primitives, and one might wonder about the connection between the postnatal emergence of such representations and our present concern: changes in functional architecture that result in the emergence of new implicit theories. The relation between the two issues is twofold: First, note our position in the dialectic; at this point, I intend to establish the possibility that functional architecture can change postnatally. To do so, it will suffice to have established any form of postnatal change in functional architecture, including as a possibility, the emergence 31 of primitive explicit representations. Second, we should also consider the possibility that, at least in some cases, it is at least partly via this very kind of change, i.e., the emergence of primitive representations, that a new theory implicit in the architecture can come to be held by the subject.
16 Computation, p. 132. 17 One could claim that all such architectural changes do, in fact, amount to the unfolding of knowledge present at birth; however, in order to legitimate such a claim, one would have to offer a supporting view of what it is for knowledge to be present. The following view--echoing one of the nativist targets of Book I of Locke's Essay (see Chapter 2, §5)--would suffice: Knowledge of As is present in a subject if and only if either(a) the subject explicitly represents knowledge of As, (b) the subject is so constituted that, given certain experiences, she will someday acquire a concept with the content A that will appear in an explicit representation of knowledge about As, or (c) the subject is so constituted that, given certain experiences, she will someday acquire implicit knowledge of As. This view justifies the claim that all primitive, unlearned LOT terms refer to things about which subjects know something at birth, notwithstanding postnatal changes in architecture, yet it does so at great cost: we know something at birth about all things--including cats--some knowledge of which we will ever explicitly represent. Cummins must reject this strategy; this cannot be the sort of knowing Cummins has in mind when he treats the claim that "[W]e are not born knowing how cats look" as standing in need of no support. Cummins might have some other, general view in mind that would legitimate the claim that all physical changes in functional architecture amount to the unfolding of knowledge present at birth, but I can not make it out; it is difficult to see how any view could be permissive enough to support the claim all architectural changes amount to the unfolding of knowledge present at birth, while being at the same time restrictive enough to support Cummins's antinativist views regarding our knowledge of that to which such concepts as 'cat' apply. 18 The causal theorist might, with some justification, approach these matters differently: She might acknowledge
substantive constraints on what is to count as implicit theory, but also argue that NTDP is false, that there are cases where we gain nothing by characterizing in semantic terms (as, say, bits of theory implicit in the functional architecture) whatever mediating machinery facilitates reliable detection. (This point was suggested by a comment of Aaron Meskin's.) I have, however, chosen to accept NTDP for the sake of argument and to criticize Cummins's position on other grounds. 32 19 For an important qualification see 536 (also, RTA, p. 132). Here Cummins acknowledges his use of 'know' to be unorthodox in some respects, for it is the cognitive scientist's use, rather than the philosopher's. Whereas the philosopher's use implies the truth of what is known and also that it is justified, to know P in the cognitive scientist's sense, the subject need only treat P as if it were reliable information (i.e., the subject need only believe P, in the not very demanding sense of 'believe' that allows you to believe that P without any conscious access to the content of P and without your being able to employ the belief that P in a wide range of contexts). For present purposes, Cummins's semantic clarification is moot. To be true to traditional philosophical usage, some may wish to substitute 'believe' (or given the lack of any requirement of conscious access, 'believe*'; or, following Chomsky, 'cognize') in place of 'know' when we encounter the latter in Cummins's argument. Then, however, I will simply translate the argument in the text into talk about believing (or believing*, or cognizing), without any loss of force:
We should still want to know why being unlearned and primitive implies the possession at birth of certain beliefs (or beliefs* or cognizings). Equivocation continues to dash Cummins's argument: Only if Cummins has in mind a standard meaning of 'belief' does the altered (P2) seem as obviously correct as Cummins takes it to be, yet being primitive and unlearned only seems to stand any chance of implying the presence, at birth, of beliefs that mediate reliable detection, in keeping with (P1), if 'belief' is used in a nonstandard, permissive way. To pursue the argument of the present section, I need only assume the satisfaction of the weak condition that there should exist nonsemantic, although not necessarily syntactic, individuation criteria for LOT terms: when the LOT theorist says, "That item has content C," I expect the LOT theorist to be able to describe what that item is, in some way other than by reference to C. Note that this condition does not demand anything nearly as strong as might be demanded by a species-wide type-type identity criterion, which is often construed to require that a given LOT term individuated nonsemantically should be found in all the various members of the same species and found to have the same content in all members of the species. In order that quasi-reductive cognitive theories invoking LOT possess the explanatory value they are supposed to, these theories would seem to have to assume no more than a certain amount of intrasubjective stability in the relationship between the subject's LOT terms individuated nonsemantically and the contents of those terms: A satisfactory explanation of the way in which an individual subject's cognitive system implements a given content-based psychological generalization might appeal only to the repeated appearance of a vehicle possessing the same content in that subject on different occasions when the subject instantiates the regularity in question (the precise degree of intrasubjective stability of the vehicle required in order that these hoped for explanatory purposes be served is an issue for another day). So long as contentful states can be attributed to a range of subjects, we can hope for content-based psychological generalizations that apply to all of those subjects, regardless of what variations may appear, from subject to subject, in the intrasubjectively stable vehicles to which those contents are attached. there may be some as yet unspecified sense in which the vehicle is present at birth--but see the preceding note).
Epigenesis of Mind
Perhaps the content of an innate concept, present at birth, attaches to one nonsemantically individuated LOT term, then "hops" to another as the next "host" develops. Recognizing this possibility, though, hardly makes it probable that there are present at birth vehicles carrying all the contents of terms typically claimed by cognitive scientists to be innate (or, more generally, of all of the primitive, unlearned LOT terms).
We should also consider the possibility that one could possess at birth knowledge regarding the application of a LOT term even when that term has not yet formed in one's cognitive or biological systems; however, without further development of this proposal, it is difficult to say whether it is at all plausible in the human case. 39 Here Cummins may wish to follow some prominent nativists, dismissing the present discussion of neurobiological 42 There are two general ways in which we can conceive of the semantic status of such LOT terms as 'fur', 'legs', and 'whiskers', as these terms appear in the axioms associated with 'cat' (call these auxiliary terms): Either their content is in place at the time the axioms are framed, or they, like 'cat,' initially appear in the axioms as protorepresentations. When, in the text, I discuss explicitly represented theoretical axioms, I take all auxiliary terms to have their content fixed. A referee for this journal expressed concern that this assumption entails an unacceptable regress. Thus, in what follows, I explain in more detail the semantic status of auxiliary terms, and why their role in the coining of new LOT terms is unproblematic.
There are three routes by which auxiliary terms may have their content fixed prior to their appearing in the relevant axioms: either (1) by definitional combination of other LOT terms whose contents are fixed; (2) by the mediation of explicitly represented, but nondefinitional axioms in which auxiliary terms appear--axioms of just the sort presently under discussion, but directed at protorepresentations 'legs' or 'whiskers' instead of the protorepresentation 'cat'; or (3) by the mediation of implicit theory. Following Cummins (537), and in keeping with a broad consensus among philosophers of mind and language, I do not hope for much mileage from the first option:
definitions are too few, the case of 'bachelor' notwithstanding; and in so far as auxiliary terms sometimes are fully including cases where axioms consist wholly of protorepresentations, for here I intend to show how a LOT term can be acquired by the mediating effects of explicit theory.
It is possible that at least one of protorepresentation t's axioms is partly explicit, partly implicit, containing at least one auxiliary term with content fixed and at least one protorepresentation beyond t. I trust that the views presented here provide a framework for handling such mixed cases, but a full discussion of them would lead us farther afield than constraints of space allow. 43 Here one might imagine a best-match, or 'nearest neighbor', system with a threshold of difference beyond which no match will be made, and instead a new term coined; furthermore, the system could be such that when a match is made and the stimulus differs from the prototype, the stimulus "pulls" the prototype toward it in similarity space.
For discussion of nearest neighbor, prototype-based categorization, see Churchland and Sejnowski, The Computational Brain, p. 76ff. 44 That is, it may be a mistake to think that the cognitive system holds a theory as to when it will introduce a new LOT term (individuated nonsemantically) and when instead it will integrate the information given in new experiences into existing representational structures. In contrast, I surely am suggesting a theory (or, more accurately, a theory-outline) of the workings of one aspect of the cognitive system; see Cummins's discussion of this distinction in "Inexplicit Information," pp. 123-25. 45 For statements of the orthodox view, see Fodor, The Language of Thought, pp. 31, 46, 56, 99 ; also see Fodor, The Modularity of Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981), p. 5; Fodor, Concepts, pp. 10-11; Pylyshyn, Computation, pp. 51-58; Churchland and Sejnowski, The Computational Brain, pp. 62-66 . Whether the orthodox view grounds a criticism of the present proposal depends on how tightly one associates computation and semantically interpretable states. That is, one might claim that it is essential to computation that it only be carried out over semantically interpreted states or units; this understanding of computation seems to conflict with the present proposal. On the other hand, one might, as Pylyshyn does, think that our best cognitive theories will sometimes deal in computations over interpreted states, while at the same time including nonsemantic explanations of important aspects of cognition:
" Regarding the present concern, that mediation by intentional mechanisms fixes content nonatomistically, I would, following Fodor, emphasize (a), at least with respect to many learned, primitive LOT terms. In certain cases,
